

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 7 MBFR VIENNA 0131

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN

REPS JULY 2, 1974

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0130

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL SESSION

WITH EASTERN REPS HELD ON 2, JULY 1974. PARAGRAPHS

1 THROUGH 5 CONTAINING SUMMARY TRANSMITTED

REFTEL.

6. FRG REP AS HOST GREETED PARTICIPANTS. DRAWING ON
TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP, HE SAID THAT,
AT THE LAST SESSION, THERE HAD BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF
THE FRAMEWORK IN WHICH CURRENT DISCUSSIONS WERE TAKING
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PLACE, AND IT WAS DESIRABLE TO HAVE CLARITY ON THIS

MATTER. THE ISSUE WHICH PARTICIPANTS IN THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS HAD AGREED TO ADDRESS WAS THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES WILL BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO RESOLVING THIS QUESTION, BEFORE ADDRESSING OTHER ISSUES. ON THIS POINT, IT WAS CLEAR THAT PARTICIPANTS WERE IN AGREEMENT AND THAT THERE WAS NO DISPUTE. HOWEVER, AT THE LAST SESSION, SOVIET REP HAD GONE BEYOND THIS AGREED POINT TO SUGGEST THAT THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE DISCUSSIONS MIGHT BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE DISCUSSION NOW OF OTHER ISSUES, SPECIFICALLY THE ISSUE OF WHAT FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED.

7. FRG REP SAID ALLIED VIEW ON THIS MATTER WAS THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD STICK TO THE EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE AGREED QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIED REPS CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD BE THE MOST PRODUCTIVE APPROACH. THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING IN THE GROUP WAS THAT A RESOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE OVERALL PROGRAM OF EITHER SIDE, AND WOULD BE TENTATIVE, PENDING RESOLUTION OF OTHER QUESTIONS THAT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED. FURTHER, IT HAD BEEN AGREED IN THE GROUP THAT, IN DISCUSSING THE AGREED QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES FROM THE OUTSET, PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE FREE TO REFER TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF THEIR PROGRAMS WHICH BEAR ON IT, BUT WOULD NOT EXPECT TO NEGOTIATE ON THESE ELEMENTS THEMSELVES UNTIL LATER.

8. FRG REP SAID THAT RESOLUTION OF THE AGREED QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, EVEN IF THAT RESOLUTION WERE ONLY ON A TENTATIVE BASIS, WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS TOPIC WAS THE MOST EASILY SEPARATED FROM THE REMAINING ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAMS OF BOTH SIDES. IT WAS THE ISSUE WHICH IS MOST LOGICAL TO SOLVE AT THE OUTSET AND WHICH, FOR THE REASON GIVEN, HAS THE BEST CHANCE OF TENTATIVE SOLUTION. MOREOVER, PARTICIPANTS COULD HAVE A FAR MORE PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE NEXT TOPIC IDENTIFIED BY SOVIET REP, THE QUESTION OF REDUCTIONS, IF THEY HAD ALREADY REACHED A TENTATIVE UNDERSTANDING ON THE ISSUE

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OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. SO ALLIED REPS SAW NO INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN SEEKING TO RESOLVE THE AGREED QUESTION AND SUBSEQUENTLY MOVING TOWARD WORKING OUT ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY CONTINUED TO THINK THAT THE METHOD OF ADDRESSING QUESTIONS ONE BY ONE, AND RESOLVING THEM IN SEQUENCE, WAS THE MOST EFFICIENT METHOD OF APPROACHING THE TASK ALL PARTICIPANTS WERE ENGAGED IN.

9. FRG REP CONTINUED THAT, ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES CONTINUE TO DIFFER. EASTERN POSITION HAD BEEN THAT ALL SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. ORIGINAL ALLIED POSITION WAS THAT ONLY THE US AND USSR SHOULD REDUCE AND THAT OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ASSUME NO SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THEIR FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE. OVER THE LAST FEW SESSION, PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN SEEKING MIDDLE GROUND ON THIS QUESTION. AS ALLIED REPS SAW IT, THERE HAD BEEN THREE ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE THIS MIDDLE GROUND. THERE WAS THE ALTERNATIVE ALLIES HAD PUT FORWARD, THEIR OWN DEFINITION OF THE MIDDLE GROUND. THEY HAD SUGGESTED THAT THE US AND USSR WOULD REDUCE IN PHASE ONE, AND THAT ALL OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS COULD ASSUME IN PHASE ONE AN OBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE THEIR GROUND FORCES MANPOWER BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES. PHASE TWO NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN AT A SPECIFIED TIME, AND A PHASE ONE AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN A PROVISION FOR REVIEWING THE RESULTS OF PHASE ONE, AND PROGRESS IN THE PHASE TWO NEGOTIATIONS, BY A SPECIFIED TIME. PHASE TWO REDUCTIONS WOULD, ON THE WESTERN SIDE, FOCUS ON REDUCTIONS OF THE FORCES OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US.

10. FRG REP SAID A SECOND ALTERNATIVE HAD BEEN ADVANCED AT THE JUNE 18 SESSION OF THIS GROUP. AT THAT TIME, EAST HAD SUGGESTED THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MIGHT AGREE TO REDUCE UNDER AN INITIAL AGREEMENT, BUT THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS BY SOME PARTICIPANTS MIGHT BEGIN LATER THAN IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS BY THE US AND USSR--AND POSSIBLY SOME OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS -- HAD BEGUN. ALLIED REPS HAD POINTED OUT

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THAT THIS SUGGESTION DID NOT REPRESENT TRUE MIDDLE GROUND, BECAUSE ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD STILL BE REQUIRED TO REDUCE UNDER AN INITIAL AGREEMENT. ONLY THE IMPLEMENTATION WOULD BE STAGED. ALLIED REPS HAD ALSO SAID THAT THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THIS ALTERNATIVE MIGHT NOT BE COMPLETE AND ASKED SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT IT WHICH EAST HAD YET TO ANSWER.

11. FRG REP SAID THAT, AT LAST SESSION, WHAT MIGHT THEORETICALLY BE ANOTHER POSSIBLE APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE WAS MENTIONED. AMBASSADOR SMIRNOVSKY HAD SAID THAT IT MIGHT AS A THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY BE MIDDLE GROUND IF SOME COUNTRIES -- HE MENTIONED THE FRG, UK, CANADA AND ALSO BELGIUM -- WOULD ALSO REDUCE IN THE FIRST PHASE. IN OTHER WORDS, ANOTHER WAY OF DEFINING THE MIDDLE GROUND

MIGHT BE TO SAY THAT MORE THAN TWO, BUT LESS THAN ALL, OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE IN PHASE ONE, AND THAT THE OTHERS WOULD REDUCE IN PHASE TWO. HOWEVER, IF THE EAST COULD ENVISAGE DEFERRING REDUCTIONS BY SOME OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR TO PHASE TWO, ALLIED REPS WONDERED WHY IT COULD NOT ENVISAGE DEFERRING REDUCTIONS BY ALL OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR TO PHASE TWO.

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FROM US REP MBFR

12. FRG REP SAID THAT, AS ALLIED REPS HAD POINTED OUT, THE REAL QUESTION NOW AT ISSUE WAS WHAT KIND OF COMMITMENTS OR OBLIGATIONS THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TAKE FROM THE OUTSET WITH REGARD TO THEIR FORCES. ALLIED REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION THAT ALL SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS BY REMAINING WESTERN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE DEFERRED TO PHASE TWO. BUT TO MEET EASTERN CONCERNs, THEY HAD MODIFIED THAT

POSITION. THEY HAD DEMONSTRATED THEIR FLEXIBILITY.
THEY HAD INDICATED THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF A SATISFACTORY
PHASE I AGREEMENT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO DEAL WITH
CERTAIN ISSUES WHICH THEY HAD ORIGINALLY WISHED TO POST-
PHONE TO THE SECOND PHASE.

13. FRG REP CONTINUED THAT, EVEN SO, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS
HAD CONTINUED TO ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT WHICH OF THE

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REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE, WHEN THEY
WOULD REDUCE, AND BY HOW MUCH THEY WOULD REDUCE. AT
LAST SESSION, FOR EXAMPLE, AMBASSADOR SMIRNOVSKY HAD
OBSERVED THAT THE ALLIES HAD NOT SAID THAT THE REMAINING
WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES,
AND THAT THE EAST STILL DID NOT KNOW WHO WOULD REDUCE
AND BY HOW MUCH. BUT ALLIED REPS HAD IN FACT MOVED TO
MEET THEIR CONCERNS. THEY HAD SUGGESTED HOW THE BEGINNING
AND CONCLUSION OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE SET;
THEY HAD INDICATED THE OVERALL DIMENSIONS OF PHASE II
REDUCTIONS; AND THEY HAD SAID THAT PHASE II REDUCTIONS
WOULD, ON THE WESTERN SIDE, FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF THE
REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. IT WAS CLEAR, THEREFORE,
THAT ALLIED REPS HAD MADE MAJOR MODIFICATIONS OF THEIR
ORIGINAL POSITION THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN PARTICI-
PANTS WOULD ASSUME NO SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO THEIR FORCES IN PHASE ONE. INSTEAD, THEY HAD SAID
THAT THEY COULD CONSIDER ASSUMING CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS IN
PHASE ONE, THEREBY NARROWING THE RANGE OF THE ISSUES
WHICH UNDER ORIGINAL ALLIED CONCEPT WOULD HAVE BEEN LEFT
FOR DECISION IN PHASE TWO.

14. FRG REP CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS NOW UP TO EAST TO
MAKE A MOVE OF CORRESPONDING IMPORTANCE. FOR THEIR PART,
ALLIED REPS HAD SAID THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO CONSIDER
FURTHER VARIANTS ON THEIR ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF THE
OBLIGATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE REMAINING DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS IN PHASE ONE, SHORT OF A DECISION IN THE
FIRST PHASE BY THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN PHASE ONE. ALLIED REPS WERE
READY TO CONSIDER FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS OR SUGGESTIONS
EAST MIGHT WISH TO PUT FORWARD ON THIS BASIS.

15. GDR REP SAID THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD FOR THEIR
PART ALSO CARRIED OUT AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DISCUSSION
WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN THE JUNE 25 SESSION. AS
EASTERN REPS UNDERSTOOD IT, PARTICIPANTS WERE CONTINUING
IN THEIR EFFORT TO FIND A SOLUTION OF HOW TO SETTLE THE
QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN
CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THE LAST SESSION, EASTERN REPS HAD

POINTED OUT THAT THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 8

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PROVIDED A GOOD AND COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION. THEY HAD ONCE AGAIN STRESSED THE NEED TO INCLUDE ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR FORCES FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. USCH A SOLUTION WOULD OPEN THE WAY FOR AN AGREEMENT ON FORCE REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD NOT PREJUDICE THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTY. IN THIS CONNECTION, EASTERN REPS HAD RENEWED THEIR READINESS TO SEARCH FOR A FIRST STEP WHICH WOULD MAKE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS POSSIBLE.

16. GDR REP SAID EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THERE ALREADY EXISTED AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE DESIRABILITY AND NECESSITY OF SUCH A SEARCH FOR A FIRST STEP. HOWEVER IN THE LAST SESSION, WESTERN REPS HAD NOT FOLLOWED THIS COURSE AND EASTERN REPS HAD RECEIVED IMPRESSION THAT WESTERN REPS WERE TRYING TO LEAVE THIS PATH. WESTERN REPS HAD AGAIN TAKEN A POSITION WHICH INDICATED THAT THEY CONSIDERED THAT THEIR BASIC STARTING POSITION WAS THE ONLY WAY TO MIDDLE GROUND. THIS IMPRESSION HAD BEEN CONFIRMED BY FRG REPS' REMARKS ON THE PRESENT OCCASION. WESTERN REPS HAD REFERRED TO THEIR WILLINGNESS TO MODIFY THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION AND TO FIX THE TIME FOR THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON A SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS. THEY HAD MENTIONED THAT THEY WERE NOW READY TO ASSUME OBLIGATIONS ON NON-INCREASE OF THEIR GROUND FORCES MANPOWER BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES. AS A THIRD POINT, THEY HAD MENTIONED THE POSSIBLE ACCEPTANCE OF A REVIEW CLAUSE. EASTERN REPS HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT THIS APPROACH AND THE SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS DID NOT MEET WITH THEIR UNDERSTANDING. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE WESTERN APPROACH STILL ENVISAGED THAT ONLY TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS CONTINUED TO EXCLUDE ASSUMING CLEAR OBLIGATIONS FOR THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES. BUT THIS HAD BEEN THE ORIGINAL WESTERN STARTING POSITION, SO WHERE WAS THE MIDDLE GROUND IN THIS?

17. GDR REP CONTINUED THAT, AS REGARDS THE MODIFICATIONS OF THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION MADE BY THE WEST, THESE MODIFICATIONS DID NOT CHANGE ANYTHING AS REGARDS THE BASIC CHARACTER OF THE WESTERN APPROACH. AS LONG AS THEY DID NOT INCLUDE OBLIGATIONS BY THE REMAINING WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES, THAT IS, THE FORCES OF THE SIX

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WESTERN COUNTRIES ASIDE FROM THE UNITED STATES, THE MAIN POINT WAS THAT THE MODIFICATIONS OR SUPPLEMENTS ADVANCED BY THE ALLIED REPS WERE ALL BASED ON THE WESTERN PLAN THE EAST WAS IN EFFECT BEING INVITED TO ACCEPT THIS ALLIED PLAN AS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. THEREFORE, HE WAS OBLIGED TO STATE THAT THE WESTERN PLAN WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR THE EAST, NOT BECAUSE IT WAS A WESTERN PLAN, BUT BECAUSE IT CONFLICTED WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY IN THAT IT WOULD GIVE THE NATO

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FROM US REP MBFR

COUNTRIES A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AND WAS THUS AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THIS WAS NOT A REALISTIC SOLUTION OF THE ISSUE; ANY SUCH SOLUTION MUST BE ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS.

18. GDR REP CONTINUED THAT EASTERN REPS STILL CONSIDERED THAT THE DRAFT AGREEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ON

NOVEMBER 8, 1973, WOULD PROVIDE A SOLID BASIS FOR REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

WESTERN COUNTRIES BASED THEIR RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT THIS DRAFT AGREEMENT MAINLY ON THE ARGUMENT THAT IT DID NOT ACCORD WITH THE AIM OF NATO TO CHANGE THE EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO THE FAVOR OF NATO. THIS AIM WAS ONE-SIDED AND UNREALISTIC. IN THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT A SOLUTION WAS PROPOSED THAT, GIVEN THE EXISTING SECRET

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GALANCE OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ASSUME EQUAL OBLIGATIONS. EASTERN REPS DID NOT SUGGEST THAT ANY PARTICIPANT SHOULD ASSUME OBLIGATIONS WHICH THEY WERE NOT READY TO ASSUME THEMSELVES. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD DECREASE CONFRONTATION IN AN IMPORTANT AREA WITHOUT UNI-LATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR ANYONE, THUS STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF ALL THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE.

19. GDR REP SAID IT WAS USEFUL TO REPEAT THE BASIC APPROACH HE HAD JUST DESCRIBED. HE BELIEVED IT EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF AN EFFORT TO FIND A FIRST STEP SOLUTION IN ORDER TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE IDEAS THE EAST HAD PUT FORWARD IN THIS CONNECTION SPOKE FOR THEMSELVES. THEREFORE, IT WAS NOT CORRECT FOR FRG REP TO SAY AS HE HAD JUST DONE THAT IT WAS UP TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO GIVE A REPLY. EASTERN REPS WERE READY TO SEARCH FOR A FIRST STEP SOLUTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. THIS DEMONSTRATED EASTERN FLEXIBILITY. IT WAS STILL THE EASTERN FEELING THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT OFFER AND THE EAST EXPECTED A REPLY FROM THE WEST AS TO ITS WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS A FIRST STEP. THE EAST HAD ALREADY SHOWN IT WAS READY TO DO SO. THE UNDER-STANDINGS REACHED IN THIS GROUP ON PROCEDURES DID NOT PRECLUDE A SEARCH FOR SUCH A FIRST STEP, BUT WERE INTENDED AS A MEANS OF FINDING A WAY TO MOVE FORWARD IN THE NEGO-TIATIONS.

20. FRG REP SAID HE WISHED TO COMMENT ON GDR REP'S COMMENT ABOUT THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE USEFULNESS OF SEARCHING FOR A FIRST STEP. THE ONLY UNDERSTANDING PARTICIPANTS IN THESE SESSIONS HAD REACHED, WHICH SHOULD CONTINUE TO GUIDE THE STEPS OF PARTICIPANTS, WAS ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. AS REGARDS THIS AGREED SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION, GDR REP HAD SAID NOTHING EXCEPT THAT EVERYONE SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. SMIRNOVSKY COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS ALL THAT NEEDED TO BE SAID ON THE SUBJECT.

21. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO MAKE A FEW

COMMENTS BASED ON WHAT FRG REP HAD JUST SAID. AS A FIRST POINT, FRG REP HAD JUST MENTIONED THE ISSUE OF WHOSE
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FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. HE WISHED TO STATE EASTERN VIEW OF THIS TOPIC ONCE MORE. IN THE RESPECTIVE OVERALL NEGOTIATING PLANS OF EAST AND WEST, BOTH SIDES HAD TAKEN POSITIONS INDICATING HOW THE SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET SHOULD BE REACHED. AS REGARDS THE EASTERN PLAN, IT CONTAINED A CLEAR PROVISION THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE OVER A THREE-YEAR PERIOD BETWEEN 1975 AND 1977 AND A CLEAR PROVISION THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES. EASTERN REPS BELIEVED THIS WAS AN EQUITABLE APPROACH SINCE THE MILITARY ALLIANCES WERE DIFFERENTLY COMPOSED. THEREFORE, THOSE WHO DID NOT SEEK UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE SHOULD PROCEED FROM THE VIEW THAT THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

22. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT EASTERN REPS WERE SEEKING AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION. THEY HAD PROPOSED THAT ALL SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS FROM THE OUTSET. BUT ALLIED REPS HAD PROPOSED REDUCTION OF THE FORCES ONLY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR. THIS CLEARLY INDICATED THAT ALLIES WISHED TO EXEMPT THREE-QUARTERS OF THE NATO FORCES FROM REDUCTIONS. IT WAS CLEAR, AND ALLIED REPS HAD MENTIONED THESE FIGURES THEMSELVES, THAT SOVIET FORCES MADE UP 50 PERCENT OF THE PACT FORCES, WHEREAS THREE-QUARTERS OF THE NATO FORCES WERE NOT US FORCES. THIS MEANT THAT THE ALLIES WERE PROPOSING TO EXEMPT THREE-QUARTERS OF THEIR FORCES FROM REDUCTIONS. FROM THIS IT WAS CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE AIMING FOR UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

23. KHLESTOV SAID THE EASTERN APPROACH WAS THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE. THIS WAS EQUITABLE AND CORRESPONDED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. THE WESTERN APPROACH ON THE OTHER HAND WAS TO COVER NEARLY 50 PERCENT OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES WITH A REDUCTION PROPOSAL AND TO FAIL TO COVER THREE-QUARTERS OF THE NATO FORCES. THIS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE WESTERN APPROACH WAS INEQUITABLE AND THAT IT CONFLICTED WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. THE CLOSING REMARKS MADE BY FRG REP IN THE
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PRESENT SESSION DEMONSTRATED ONCE AGAIN THAT ALLIED REPS WERE
MAKING THEIR INEQUITABLE SUGGESTIONS STRICTLY WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR ORIGINAL PLAN.

24. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT ALLIED REP HAD SAID
THAT REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD ACCEPT ANY
OBLIGATION SHORT OF REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET AND
THAT ON THIS BASIS THEY WERE WILLING TO LISTEN TO ANY
CLARIFICATION THE EASTERN SIDE MIGHT RAISE. WHAT
ALLIED REPS HAD SAID ABOUT THE NON-INCREASE FORMULA HAD
NOTHING TO DO WITH REDUCTIONS. SO ALLIED REPS HAD MADE IT
CLEAR ONCE AGAIN THAT THE REMAINING SIX WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS DID NOT WISH TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES. THE
SITUATION WAS THAT THE FOUR SOCIALIST DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
WERE PREPARED TO ASSUME OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE THEIR
FORCES FROM THE OUTSET ON THE BASIS OF MUTUALITY. THUS
THEY SHOWED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO FULFILL THE PROVISIONS
OF THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973. OF THE SEVEN
WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, ON THE OTHER HAND, ONLY
THE UNITED STATES WAS WILLING TO EXPRESS ITS WILLINGNESS

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FROM US REP MBFR

TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THE SIX REMAINING WESTERN
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD FAILED TO DO SO.

25. KHLESTOV SAID THAT HE HAD POINTED OUT EARLIER IN HIS
PRESENT REMARKS THAT THIS WAS A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THE
WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE SEEKING UNILATERAL
ADVANTAGE. BECAUSE THEIR PROPOSAL COVERED ONLY ONE-QUARTER
OF THEIR OWN FORCES WHILE IT COVERED 50 PERCENT OF THE
WARSAW PACT FORCES INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATION,
THE WESTERN POSITION CONFLICTED WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF
UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. IN REPLY TO ALL THE WESTERN ARGUMENTS
EASTERN REPS HAD HEARD SO FAR THAT THE WESTERN DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS NEEDED CONFIDENCE, EASTERN REPS HAD DEMON-
STRATED WHY WESTERN PROPOSALS COULD NOT SERVE AS A BASIS
FOR AGREEMENT SINCE THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
WOULD NOT BE PARTICIPATING IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET.

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THEREFORE, IT WAS THE CLEAR CONSLUSION OF EASTERN REPS THAT
THE WESTERN POSITION, BASED ON A REQUIREMENT THAT ALL
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET
WAS INEQUITABLE AND NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST. THROUGHOUT
THE THIRD ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
WHILE SHOWING WHY THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS WESTERN
PROPOSAL, AND WHILE ADHERING TO THEIR POSITION THAT ALL
ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS
FROM THE OUTSET, HAD MADE SERIOUS AND FLEXIBLE EFFORTS TO BRING
THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. THEY HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT THE
EASTERN PLAN WAS EQUITABLE, CONTAINED CLEAR-CUT OBLIGATIONS
AS TO WHO SHOULD REDUCE, THE AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS, AND
THE THREE-YEAR TIMETABLE FOR THESE REDUCTIONS. THE
EASTERN PROPOSAL CORRESPONDED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

26. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, WHILE MAINTAINING THEIR POSITION
AS SET FORTH IN THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT, EASTERN REPS HAD
NEVERTHELESS STATED THAT, IN ORDER TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS
FORWARD, THEY WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS A FIRST STEP OF
REDUCTIONS OF ARMS AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.
EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO SAID THAT FIRST STEP SHOULD BE
TAKEN WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THEIR OVERALL PLAN AS SET FORTH
IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.
EASTERN REPS HAD ACTED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT, IF THEY SUCCEEDED,
IT WOULD IN THIS WAY ALSO HELP SOLUTION OF THOSE QUESTIONS
NOT COVERED IN A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT. EASTERN REPS

HAD ALSO SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN THEIR UNDER-STANDING THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING TO PROCEED ON THE SAME LINE AND THAT, IN OTHER WORDS, WHILE STICKING WITH THEIR BASIC PLAN, WESTECN PARTICIPANTS WERE READY TO SEEK A FIRST STEP.

27 KHLESTOV SAID EASTERN REPS HAD HAD IMPRESSION THAT, IN THE INFORMAL MEETING ON JUNE 18, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE GOOD TO SEEK AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. IN FACT WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAD EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO SEEK SUCH AN INITIAL STEP. BUT DISCUSSION IN THE INFORMAL SESSION ON JUNE 25 HAD INDICATED THAT THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WERE MOVING AWAY FROM THIS
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POSITION AND DID NOT WISH TO SEEK AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. THE REMARKS MADE BY THE FRG REP ON THE PRESENT OCCASION HAD REINFORCED THE EASTERN IMPRESSION THAT WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES DID NOT WISH TO SEEK SUCH AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP. FROM HIS VIEWPOINT, FRG REP HAD NOT BEEN PRECISE IN STATING THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS. FRG REP HAD SAID WESTERN REPS WERE PREPARED TO SEEK A SOLUTION ONLY TO QUESTION NUMBER 1, WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. IN OTHER WORDS, ALLIED REPS HAD IN EFFECT SAID THAT THEY WERE READY TO SEED A MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTION FOR THIS QUESTION NOT IN THE CONTEXT OF A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT, BUT RATHER IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERALL ISSUES OF NEGOTIATION.

28. KHLESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO EXPLAIN THIS REMARK FURTHER. IF PARTICIPANTS CONSIDERED THE EASTERN PLAN IN ITS ENTIRETY, IT PROVIDED A COMPLETE TIMETALE AND SPECIFIED TYPES AND AMOUNTS OF REDUCTIONS TO BE MADE. THE WESTERN PLAN ALSO HAD A BROAD RANGE OF DETAILS. THE EASTERN PLAN CONTAINED A SERIES OF ELEMENTS, FOR EXAMPLE, WHO SHOULD BEGIN REDUCTIONS, WHAT KIND OF TROOPS, THE AMOUNTS AND OTHER ASPECTS. IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO EXERT ONE'S EFFORTS TO BRING THESE TWO PLANS TOGETHER IN ALL OF THEIR ASPECTS, TAKING AS A BASIS THE EASTERN PLAN ON THE ONE HAND AND THE ENTIRE WESTERN PLAN ON THE OTHER, THE LATTER BEING DESIGNED TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN SOME UN-DETERMINED PERIOD OF TIME "PERHAPS 10 YEARS."

29. KHLESTOV SAID IT WOULD SEEM MORE DIFFICULT TO EASTERN REPS TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION FOR THE ENTIRE RANGE OF QUESTIONS AND THE LONG PERIOD PROVIDED FOR IN BOTH THESE PLANS. SECOND, BOTH PLANS DETAILED A SUB-STANTIAL NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS PARTICIPANTS COULD OF COURSE GO AHEAD TO TRY TO RECONCILE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF

BOTH THESE PLANS. THIS WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME. BUT
IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT PARTICIPANTS WERE CONFRONTED WITH
HIGHLY COMPLEX ISSUES, IT HAD BEEN THE EASTERN VIEW THAT
THEY SHOULD SEEK A FIRST-STEP WHICH COULD BE CARRIED
OUT IN A SHORTER PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH THE EASIER
ISSUES MIGHT BE TACKLED. THUS, THE EASTERN FIRST STEP
APPROACH WOULD COVER A SHORTER PERIOD OF TIME. THIS

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STEP WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE INDIVIDUAL
QUESTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.
THUS, IT WOULD CONTAIN A SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES
SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, WHAT AMOUNTS OF REDUC-
TIONS AND WHAT KIND OF TROOPS. IN THIS WAY IT WOULD BE
EASIER TO FIND A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION FOR A SHORT PERIOD
OF TIME AND FOR A NARROWER RANGE OF ISSUES FROM THE
POINT OF VIEW OF BOTH SIDES. NATURALLY, SOME ELEMENTS WOULD
NOT BE COVERED IN SUCH A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT. THIS MEANT
THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE A PROVISION THAT ALL
ISSUES NOT RESOLVED IN IT WOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF THE
LATER NEGOTIATIONS.

30. US REP SAID SOVIET REP HAD JUST SUGGESTED THAT SOME
QUESTIONS WOULD NOT BE TREATED UNDER THE EASTERN CONCEPT OF

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INR-10 IO-14 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00

RSC-01 NSC-07 DRC-01 ACDE-00 /152 W

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P R 031635Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0234
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

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FROM US REP MBFR

A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT. WHAT QUESTIONS WOULD BE LEFT OUT? KHlestov did not respond to this question. He said that, according to the Eastern plan, reductions would take place through a 3-year period. The Western plan covered an indeterminantly long period, maybe up to ten years. US Rep said Soviet Rep should stop exaggerating. Allies had in mind a reasonable time of three to five years.

31. KHlestov indicated he was willing to accept that both plans covered approximately the same period of time, maybe three years in each case. But, in distinction, the Eastern first step approach involving setting a period in which action would be taken in one year only in order to find a solution to initial problems. Since the Eastern plan covered a 3-year period and the Western plan also provided for a fixed period, both sides would be bound for a longer

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period than they would under the first step approach. Since Western Reps were not ready to accept the Eastern plan in its entirety and the Eastern Reps could not accept the Western plan, Eastern Reps had drawn conclusion that participants should seek a first initial agreement covering a shorter period of time then provided for in either basic plan covering more limited aims and fewer issues. So a search for a first initial step and the elaboration of solutions within that context should be easier for both sides. No one would have to accept the entire time period or the entire reduction program of either side. The first step could cover a small number of issues. That is to say, there would be agreement on the same basic issues of who should reduce what forces and by how much, but the scope would not be the same.

32. KHlestov said he had tried to explain all of this in some detail since this was a possible road to mutually acceptable solutions. He had had the impression

IN THE JUNE 18 MEETING THAT THE ALLIED REPS HAD AGREED TO FOLLOW THIS COURSE. HE HAD THOUGHT THE ALLIES HAD ACCEPTED HIS ARGUMENTATION THAT, Owing TO THE DIFFICULTY OF COMING TO AGREEMENT ON THE ENTIRE REDUCTION PROGRAM OF BOTH SIDES, IT WOULD BE EASIER TO FIND A SOLUTION IN THE FORM OF AN INITIAL STEP OR MORE LIMITED SCOPE. EASTERN REPS CONTINUED READY TO SEARCH FOR SUCH A SOLUTION. OF COURSE, WHAT HE HAD BEEN SAYING WAS A PROCEDURAL ASPECT. THE SECOND ASPECT WAS THE CONTENT OF SUCH A FIRST STEP. ALLIED REPS HAD BEEN SAYING THAT THEY DISAGREED WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF A FIRST STEP, BUT THE PRIOR QUESTION WAS WHETHER THEY WERE PREPARED TO INITIATE A SEARCH FOR SUCH A FIRST STEP. THE EASTERN REPS HAD HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT, IN THE SESSION OF JUNE 18, ALLIED REPS HAD EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO JOIN IN SEARCH FOR THIS INITIAL STEP. IT HAD BEEN STATED ON THAT OCCASION THAT THIS SEARCH WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE PROGRAMS OF EITHER SIDE. THEREFORE, EASTERN REPS HAD HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WEST WAS WILLING TO JOIN IN THIS PROJECT. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TRY FOR SUCH A FIRST STEP. IF THEY WERE SUCCESSFUL, IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING. IF THEY FAILED, THEY COULD GO

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BACK. SO NOW HE WISHED TO ASK THE SPECIFIC QUESTION, WERE THE ALLIED REPS WILLING TO SEEK SUCH AN INITIAL STEP OR WERE THEY NOT, AS FRG REP HAD JUST BEEN INDICATING?

33. US REP SAID KHLESTOV'S REMARKS CONFIRMED THE ALLIED UNDERSTANDING THAT WHAT EAST WAS NOW PROPOSING WAS THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD DEPART FROM THE AGREEMENT WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN REACHED TO FOCUS ON THE AGREED QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. THE EXPLANATIONS KHLESTOV HAD JUST GONE THROUGH SHOWED THE SOUNDNESS OF THE ORIGINAL COMMON AGREEMENT AND THE WISDOM OF ADHERING TO IT NOW. SPECIFICALLY, KHLESTOV HAD JUST POINTED OUT THAT, UNDER BOTH THE APPROACHES HE HAD DESCRIBED, PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE BASIC ISSUES INVOLVED IN BOTH PLANS. PARTICIPANTS IN THESE SESSIONS HAD ALL UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT EARLIER. THAT WAS WHY THEY HAD AGREED TO DEAL WITH ONE PROBLEM AT A TIME, STARTING WITH THE FIRST ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES FROM THE OUTSET. ALLIED REPS CONTINUED OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS QUESTION COULD BE RESOLVED. THEY WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED IF THE EASTERN EFFORT TO MOVE AWAY FROM THE AGREED QUESTION INDICATED EASTERN BELIEF THAT PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT MAKE PROGRESS ON RESOLVING THIS QUESTION. ALLIED REPS THOUGHT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO MAKE PROGRESS. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD STAY ON THE AGREED COURSE, WHICH WAS THE BEST COURSE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

34. KHLESTOV SAID HE FEARED THAT THESE REMARKS INDICATED
THERE WAS A MISUNDERSTANDING AS REGARDS THE IMPRESSION OF

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ACTION ACDA-19

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H-03 INR-10 IO-14 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04

PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15

TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07 DRC-01 /152 W
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P R 031635Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0235

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. IN FACT, TWO ANSWERS COULD BE GIVEN TO THIS QUESTION. THE FIRST ANSWER COULD BE GIVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVER-ALL PLANS OF BOTH SIDES. THE SECOND COULD BE GIVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF A SMALL INITIAL STEP. THEREFORE, HIS REMARKS ABOUT THE NEED FOR A FIRST STEP DID NOT MEAN THAT HE WAS DEPARTING FROM THE AGREED QUESTION. BUT AN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION COULD BE PROVIDED FOR TWO DIFFERENT PURPOSES, EITHER IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL AGREEMENT OR OF A FIRST STEP. SINCE IT SEEMED EASIER TO PROVIDE AN ANSWER IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INITIAL STEP, HE HAD ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO THIS POINT. BUT HE WAS ALSO PREPARED TO FIND AN ANSWER IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERALL REDUCTION PROGRAM OF BOTH SIDES.

35. US REP SAID THIS MEANT THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT
PARTICIPANTS SHOULD PROCEED TO TRY TO FIND THE ANSWER TO
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THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, IN ANY EVENT, THIS ISSUE WAS STILL BEFORE PARTICIPANTS. THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BYPASS IT.

36. NETHERLANDS REP SAID GDR REP HAD STRESSED IN HIS OPENING REMARKS THE NECESSITY TO INCLUDE ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE BEGINNING. THIS WAS A QUESTION ALLIED REPS WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS. ALLIED REPS HAD INDICATED THEIR IDEAS ON WHAT OBLIGATIONS PARTICIPANTS SHOULD UNDERTAKE IN A FIRST AGREEMENT. THEY HAD SAID THIS WAS THE MOST PRODUCTIVE APPROACH TO SOLVING THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES FROM THE OUTSET. TO SAY THAT ALL SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET WAS ONE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. BUT ALLIED REPS HAD INDICATED WHY IT WAS NOT FEASIBLE. MOREOVER, IT HAD BEEN THE EASTERN POSITION FROM THE BEGINNING. IT WAS NOT PRODUCTIVE FOR THE EAST TO PERSIST IN THIS COURSE. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD THEREFORE TRY TO FIND REAL MIDDLE GROUND.

37. NETHERLANDS REP CONTINUED THAT THE EAST WANTED EQUAL OBLIGATIONS FROM THE OUTSET. BUT A PROPOSAL THAT ALL SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET WOULD NOT RESULT IN EQUAL OBLIGATIONS. THE US AND THE USSR, WHOSE TERRITORIES WERE OUTSIDE THE AREA, WOULD ONLY HAVE TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES. OTHERS WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES. IN ADDITION, THE LATTER GROUP WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT SOME OVER-ALL LIMITATION ON THEIR FORCE STRENGTH. THE US AND THE USSR WERE NOT BEING ASKED TO ASSUME AN OBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE THEIR OVER-ALL FORCE LEVEL. THEY DOUBTLESS WOULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH A LIMITATION IF THEY WERE ASKED TO. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES, ALLIED REPS SOUGHT BALANCED OBLIGATIONS COMMENSURATE WITH THE ACTUAL AND DIFFERENT SITUATION OF PARTICIPANTS. WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE OBLIGATIONS IN A FIRST STAGE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DIFFERENT SITUATIONS IN WHICH EACH FOUND HIMSELF. REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT TRYING TO EVADE OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE IN THE SECOND PHASE AFTER WAYS HAD BEEN FOUND TO AGREE TO A FIRST PHASE.

38. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID NETHERLANDS REP HAD JUST
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STATED SOME STATES DID NOT HAVE THE SAME SITUATION AS OTHERS. SOME WOULD WITHDRAW AND SOME WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES. BUT WHAT ABOUT THE UK AND CANADA? THEY WERE IN THE SAME POSITION AS THE US AND THE USSR.

39. NETHERLANDS REP SAID REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE COUNTRIES HAD GIVEN THEIR REASONS FOR NOT WISHING TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THEY WERE BOTH IN A SPECIAL SITUATION. GREAT BRITAIN WAS TRYING TO WORK OUT A POLITICAL UNION WITH OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. THIS QUESTION PLACED IT IN A SPECIAL SITUATION. CANADA HAD ALREADY REDUCED ITS FORCES. FRG REP ASKED WHETHER CZECHOSLOVAK REP'S REMARK MEANT THAT LATTER ENVISAGED A FIRST PHASE INVOLVING ONLY THOSE FORCES WHICH WOULD BE WITHDRAWN, I.E., OUTSIDE FORCES? CZECHOSLOVAK REP HASTILY REPLIED THAT HIS REMARK HAD NOT BEEN INTENDED AS A PROPOSAL, BUT ONLY AS A QUESTION. NONETHELESS, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POLAND AND THE GDR WERE IN THE SAME POSITION AS OTHERS IN THE AREA. THEY WERE READY TO REDUCE FROM THE BEGINNING. THEY DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY A COMMON APPROACH WAS NOT POSSIBLE HERE. THEY WERE NOT HANGING BACK.

40. GDR REP SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD MADE THIS REMARK IN THE CONTEXT OF POINTING OUT THE REASONS WHY EASTERN REPS COULD NOT ACCEPT ALLIED ARGUMENTS FOR NOT REDUCING AS VALID. BUT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO REFER BACK TO THE REMARKS OF THE SOVIET REP WHEN HE HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE REPLY EAST WOULD GIVE TO THE FIRST QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES AT THE OUTSET WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON THE CONTEXT OF WHETHER ONE WAS CONSIDERING A GENERAL AGREEMENT OR A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT. IT WOULD BE EASIER TO FIND A SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION WHEN SPEAKING OF A FIRST STEP AGREEMENT. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT WISH TO DISCUSS NUMBERS NOW, APPARENTLY ALMOST EVERYONE HAD THE FEELING THAT THIS FIRST STEP WOULD INVOLVE A LESSER NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS THAN THE FULL 17 PERCENT ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY THE EAST. BUT THIS WOULD BE MUCH EASIER IF THE AMOUNT WERE SMALL AND WOULD GIVE THE OTHERS THE BENEFIT OF EXPERIENCE. FOR EXAMPLE, BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS COULD TAKE OUT ABOUT 1,000 SOLDIERS PLUS ARMAMENTS; THEREFORE, IT WAS OF BASIC IMPORTANCE TO ASCERTAIN IN WHAT CONTEXT ONE WAS SEEKING THE REPLY TO THE SECRET

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AGREED QUESTION. HE COULD NOT AGREE THAT COUNTRIES WITH NATIONAL FORCES SHOULD BE TREATED IN A DIFFERENT WAY FROM THOSE OUTSIDE THE AREA. THERE SHOULD BE NO SEPARATE CATEGORIES. ALL STATES SHOULD HAVE AN EQUAL OBLIGATION TO REDUCE EVEN THOUGH ACCOUNT SHOULD BE TAKEN OF THEIR

INDIVIDUAL POSITION IN SOME SPECIFIC REGARDS. IN THIS WAY IT WOULD BE EASIER TO FIND THE SOLUTION.

41. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THE METHOD PROPOSED BY FRG REP IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, THE METHOD OF DEALING WITH QUESTIONS ONE BY ONE AND RESOLVING THEM IN SEQUENCE, WOULD EVENTUALLY

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 AECE-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03

INR-10 IO-14 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00

RSC-01 NSC-07 ACDE-00 DRC-01 /152 W
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P R 031635Z JUL 74
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 236
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

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FROM US REP MBFR

END UP IN AN INITIAL AGREEMENT. BUT SOVIET REP WANTED TO COVER ALL THESE SUBJECTS AT THE SAME TIME. THIS WAS AN INEFFICIENT APPROACH. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TAKE EACH PROBLEM AS IT CAME AND TRY TO REACH TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS. THEY COULD THEN PUT TOGETHER AN INITIAL AGREEMENT COVERING ALL THE ISSUES SOVIET REP HAD TOUCHED ON. THEREFORE, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ADHERE TO THE METHOD THAT HAD BEEN ORIGINALLY AGREED ON FOR DEALING WITH ISSUES. THEY COULD INDICATE FLEXIBILITY WHEN IT CAME TO INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS AND TRY TO FIND AGREEMENT ON THEM.

42. US REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON A POINT JUST
MADE BY GDR REP WHICH US REP CONSIDERED RELEVANT TO THE QUESTION OF
WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. IF HE HAD UNDER-
STOOD GDR REP CLEARLY, LATTER HAD PROPOED THAT ALL STATES
SHOULD HAVE EQUAL OBLIGATIONS FROM THE OUTSET, BUT THAT THE DIF-
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FERING CIRCUMSTANCES OF INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE REFLECTED
IN THE IMPLEMENTATION. US REP CONSIDERED THIS A GOOD FOCUS
FOR THE PRESENT TREATMENT OF THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES
FROM THE OUTSET. THIS WAS BECAUSE ALLIED REPS FELT THAT
THERE SHOULD BE A REFLECTION OF THE DIFFERING SITUATIONS OF THE
PARTICIPANTS AS REGARDS THE EXTENT OF OBLIGATIONS THEY
UNDERTOOK IN THE FIRST PHASE AS WELL AS REGARDS IMPLEMENTATION.
GDR REP ASKED WHETHER US REP'S REMARKS MEANT THAT ALLIED
REPS WERE WILLING THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD
UNDERTAKE AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE AND THAT IT WAS ONLY AN
ISSUE OF DISCUSSING THE DETAILS OF SUCH AN OBLIGATION.

43. US REP SAID ALLIED REPS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE
REMAINING WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE WILLING TO TAKE
OBLIGATIONS, BUT THEY COULD NOT UNDERTAKE AN OBLIGATION IN
THE FIRST PHASE TO REDUCE IN THAT PHASE. THE POINT HE
WAS MAKING WAS THAT DIFFERENCES IN THE SITUATIONS OF
INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE
OBLIGATIONS THEY WERE EXPECTED TO UNDERTAKE, AS WELL AS
IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS. THIS WAS A POINT
WHICH SHOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER ON THE NEXT OCCASION.

44. GDR REP SAID IT WAS TRUE THAT THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE
IN THE SITUATIONS OF VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS. BUT NONETHELESS
FROM THE OUTSET IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT ALL SHOULD
CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCTIONS. THEREFORE, THESE DIFFERENCES
COULD NOT BE GIVEN AS REASONS NOT TO REDUCE. THE
OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN IN THE JUNE 28, 1973, COMMUNIQUE
DID NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THEY
HAD BEEN TAKEN IN FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACT THAT THERE
WAS A DIFFERENCE IN THE CHARACTER OF THE OBLIGATIONS
WHICH WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN, THAT SOME WOULD WITHDRAW AND
SOME WOULD DEMOBILIZE. DESPITE THESE DIFFERENCES, IT HAD BEEN
DECIDED THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEGOTIATION WOULD BE
RESOLVED IF ALL WERE TREATED IN THE SAME WAY. FRG AND NETHERLANDS
REPS STATED THIS WAS AN INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMUNIQUE
WHICH HAD NOT ESTABLISHED ANY OBLIGATION TO REDUCE, BUT ONLY TO
NEGOTIATE ON REDUCTIONS.

45. DISCUSSION THEN CONCLUDED AND IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD
THE NEXT SESSION ON JULY 9. RESOR

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